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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
To  innovate,  ﬁrms  often  need  to  draw  from,  and  collaborate  with,  a large  number  of  actors  from  outside
their  organization.  At  the  same  time,  ﬁrms  need also  to be  focused  on  capturing  the returns  from  their
innovative  ideas.  This  gives  rise  to a paradox  of  openness—the  creation  of  innovations  often  requires
openness,  but  the  commercialization  of innovations  requires  protection.  Based  on  econometric  analysis
of data  from  a UK  innovation  survey,  we ﬁnd  a concave  relationship  between  ﬁrms’  breadth  of  externaleywords:
ppropriability strategy
nnovation
readth of openness
nnovation collaboration
ompetitor collaboration
search  and formal  collaboration  for innovation,  and  the strength  of  the ﬁrms’  appropriability  strategies.
We  show  that  this  concave  relationship  is stronger  for  breadth  of  formal  collaboration  than  for  external
search.  There  is also  partial  evidence  suggesting  that  the  relationship  is  less  pronounced  for  both  external
search  and  formal  collaboration  if  ﬁrms  do  not  draw ideas  from  or collaborate  with  competitors.  We
explore  the  implications  of these  ﬁndings  for the literature  on  open  innovation  and innovation  strategy.
© 2013  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  Open access under CC BY license.. Introduction
This paper explores how the choices of ﬁrms to be open to dif-
erent external actors are related to the choices they make about
heir appropriability strategy, that is, their approach to protec-
ing their knowledge against being copied and to appropriating
he returns from their innovative activities. The innovation process
nvolves resource intensive search to ﬁnd commercially exploitable
ew combinations of knowledge or technology (Nelson and Winter,
982; Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Hargadon and Sutton, 1997;
leming and Sorenson, 2004; Laursen, 2012). This requires orga-
izations to work with and draw knowledge from many actors
utside their organization (Shan et al., 1994; Rosenkopf and Nerkar,
001; Katila, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006). In order to render
hese efforts effective, ﬁrms need to align their internal processes
o the external environment: they need to conﬁgure their ﬁrm to
nable successful absorption of knowledge from external sources
∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Innovation and Organizational Eco-
omics, Copenhagen Business School, Kilevej 14A, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark.
el.: +45 38 15 25 65; fax: +45 38 15 25 40.
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1 Tel.: + 44 01225 386742; fax: + 44 01225 386473.
048-7333© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.10.004
Open access under CC BY license.(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Many scholars have suggested that
seeking help from external actors for innovation is becoming an
important part of managerial strategy, and argue that the innova-
tion process is becoming more open, distributed and democratic
(von Hippel, 1988, 2005; Chesbrough, 2003; Coombs et al., 2003;
Chesbrough et al., 2006).
Research has shown that ﬁrms need to protect their knowl-
edge when they engage in formal external collaboration (Cassiman
and Veugelers, 2002; Heiman and Nickerson, 2004), which is one
means that ﬁrms can use to access skills and knowledge not avail-
able within the boundaries of their organizations. In the present
study we explore two  aspects of ﬁrm openness—the breadth of the
ﬁrm’s innovation search efforts, and the range of types of part-
ner organizations in formal collaborations for innovation. In the
case of innovative search, we focus on the breadth of ﬁrms’ exter-
nal search strategies by looking at the number of separate search
channels (sources of innovation), such as suppliers, users, com-
petitors, research organizations and universities, that ﬁrms use in
their search for innovative opportunities, which Laursen and Salter
(2006), call “external search breadth”. We  also examine the breadth
of collaboration with suppliers, customers, competitors, research
organizations and universities. Formal innovation enables more
sustained exchanges between the focal ﬁrm and its external envi-
ronment, but it requires greater managerial effort to ﬁnd suitable
partners, agree on contracts and coordinate joint efforts (Dyer and
Singh, 1998).
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The current study helps to extend our knowledge about how
rms’ openness choices are linked to their need to protect their
nowledge in order to appropriate the returns from innovative
ctivities. A major problem associated with accessing external
ources of knowledge relates to the fact that, in order to obtain
nowledge, organizations have to reveal some parts of their own
nowledge to external actors. Managers make their ﬁrm “open”
y engaging with a broad set of external actors in their innova-
ion activities, but also have to protect their own ﬁrm’s knowledge
rom being copied by competitors. This represents an apparent
aradox that openness may  demand more attention to protec-
ion. Paraphrasing Arrow (1962), we describe this as the paradox
f openness. Appropriating the beneﬁts deriving from an innova-
ion requires considerable managerial attention and effort, such
s applying for patents, establishing a market lead time, keeping
ey technologies secret from competitors, and gaining access to
omplementary assets (Teece, 1986; Arora et al., 2001; Arora and
eccagnoli, 2006; Teece, 2002; Ziedonis, 2004; Ceccagnoli, 2009).
ollowing the open innovation literature, we contend that these
fforts have a major inﬂuence on the ﬁrm’s approach to the exter-
al environment in relation to who it works with, where it looks for
deas, and how it organizes its own innovative activities (Gans and
tern, 2003; Chesbrough, 2006; Somaya, 2012). By exploring the
elation between the ﬁrm’s managerial choices over appropriating
he beneﬁts from their innovations and its openness to the external
nvironment, we  hope to advance theory and practice on how best
o manage the paradox of openness.
We  suggest that the ﬁrm-level strength of overall appropriabil-
ty strategy shows a concave relation to the openness of external
earch and collaboration for innovation.2 Our argument suggests
hat appropriability and openness generally go hand-in-hand, but
hat high levels of appropriability are associated with decreasing
evels of openness. Note that, in this paper, we do not make strong
laims about causality. It might be that a strong appropriability
trategy (up to a certain point) allows more openness, alterna-
ively it might be the case that as ﬁrms become more open, they
eed to focus more on appropriability. However, in this paper, we
o not consider it of central importance to identify precisely the
irection of causality since our dependent variable and important
ndependent variables are choice variables (we return to this point
n Section 6).
We examine how the type of external engagement that ﬁrms
hoose is connected to the relationship between appropriability
trategy and openness, suggesting that the negative effect of the
ink between appropriability and openness is stronger for for-
al  collaboration breadth than for external search breadth. We
lso explore a particular case of “high-risk” openness—competitor
ollaboration, arguing that if ﬁrms do not draw from or collabo-
ate with competitors, the association between appropriability and
penness is weaker. Based on an analysis of a large sample of man-
facturing ﬁrms from the 4th wave of the UK Innovation Survey,
e ﬁnd partial or full support for the hypotheses.
. Conceptual background: openness and appropriability
Central to our understanding of the innovation process is how
rganizations search for knowledge (Nelson and Winter, 1982).
chumpeter describes of these search processes as characterized by
he need for ﬁrms to search for and carry out “new combinations”
2 Note that this is consistent with both decreasing positive marginal effects up to a
op-point (if there is a top-point) and increasing negative marginal effects after that
ossible top-point. Note also that our empirical estimations do not allow us to be
ery precise about the exact shape of the concave relationship within the pertinent
onﬁdence intervals.Policy 43 (2014) 867–878
of technologies, knowledge and markets: “To produce other things,
or the same things by a different method, means to combine these
materials and forces differently” (Schumpeter, 1912/1934: 65). In
this context, innovative search can be deﬁned as “an organization’s
problem-solving activities that involve the creation and recom-
bination of technological ideas” (Katila and Ahuja, 2002: 1184).
Indeed, ﬁrms invest considerable amounts of time, money and
other resources in their search for these opportunities (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990; Chen, 2008). Part of this search effort is expendi-
ture on R&D, but this is only one element in the search process and
may account for only a small portion of investment in the search
for innovations (Patel and Pavitt, 1995).
New models of open innovation suggesting that ﬁrms should
make greater strategic use of external knowledge have spawned
a new stream of research on the managerial dimensions of open
innovation (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; Chesbrough et al., 2006).
This perspective is consistent with research that highlights the
importance of horizontal and vertical relationships as sources
of innovation (Pavitt, 1984; von Hippel, 1988). The beneﬁts of
dedicated search activities for innovative performance have been
demonstrated in a number of empirical studies that support these
models (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004;
Laursen and Salter, 2006; Grimpe and Sofka, 2009; Garriga et al.,
2013). In addition, the beneﬁts of collaboration—with customers,
suppliers, universities and others in the innovation systems—for
innovative outcomes have been widely acknowledged in the lit-
erature (Powell et al., 1996; Ahuja, 2000; Belderbos et al., 2004;
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006).
Building on the emerging literature on open innovation, we
focus on two related forms of openness—external search and inno-
vation collaboration.3 First, we  follow Laursen and Salter (2006) and
focus on the breadth of external search related to innovating, across
a range of different sources or channels in the innovation system,
such as suppliers, customers and universities, in order to capture
the ﬁrm’s openness to external knowledge. Each of these chan-
nels may  involve interacting with a different community of practice
with perhaps opposing sets of institutional norms, habits and rules.
Firms choosing to work with these actors need to develop (costly)
organizational practices that are suited to the domain in which they
search. Cast in this light, external search can be seen as a form
of “soft” openness, typically involving drawing knowledge from
external parties without entering into legally binding agreements.
Second, we  examine the case of formal collaboration, focusing on
the breadth of the ﬁrm’s formal collaboration relationships for
innovation. Although the setting up of formal collaborations is more
problematic for managers, this type of cooperation can provide
ﬁrms with access to complementary resources to enable the suc-
cessful development of new products and processes (Powell et al.,
1996). It may  also enable them to be more adept at commercializ-
ing these ideas (Ahuja, 2000; Belderbos et al., 2004). Since formal
collaboration requires a ﬁrm and its external partner to adhere to
an agreed structure for the exchange, it can be described as a “hard”
form of openness.
To try to advance the theory and research on the drivers of
hard and soft openness, we  explore the role of appropriability for
the ﬁrm’s decision to be open to a broad set of external actors
in the context of innovation. A number of appropriability mech-
anisms (or methods) are available to managers to allow the ﬁrm to
capture rents from its organization’s intellectual assets. The impor-
tance attributed to a range of appropriability mechanisms can be
3 Of course, the concept of “open innovation” involves a wider range of mech-
anisms than those captured by external search breadth and formal collaboration.
However, these are two mechanisms that are central to understanding and mea-
surement of open innovation (Dahlander and Gann, 2010).
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onsidered, what Cohen et al. (2000: 8) term the “appropri-
bility strategy” of ﬁrms. An appropriability strategy frequently
nvolves use of formal methods, such as patents or trademarks,
s well as informal methods such as secrecy or lead times. In this
aper, we focus on the overall importance attributed to a broad
ange of protection mechanisms, including patents, registration of
esigns, secrecy, lead times, product complexity and trademarks.
e assume that more importance attributed to more appropri-
bility mechanisms (of any type) means that the ﬁrm puts more
mphasis on appropriability in general—which might have separate
ositive and negative effects on the relationship with openness.
Application of protection mechanisms is important for ﬁrms
o ensure their technology is not copied by others and to inform
egotiations over collaboration with a range of external parties
Cohen et al., 2000). The use of one form of intellectual property (IP)
ay  lead to the acquisition of complementary forms of IP, such as
rademarks and design registrations (Gambardella and Giarratana,
013). Thus, formal and informal mechanisms generally appear to
e complements (Cohen et al., 2000). Despite considerable evidence
hat such mechanisms provide only partial protection, the litera-
ure continues to emphasize innovation strategies related to the
cquisition and use of different forms of appropriability (Arora and
ambardella, 2010).
However, relatively little is known about how the ﬁrm’s atti-
ude to appropriability is associated with the openness of the ﬁrm
o external actors (see also, West, 2003). In exploring this, we want
o understand how choices in one area of managerial practice are
elated to choices in other areas. Our approach is based on the idea
hat the ﬁrm can be seen as a bundle of related choices (Rivkin,
000), and is rooted in the need for more insights into how manage-
ial choices are induced or constrained by other sets of managerial
ecisions. In particular, we seek to extend understanding of the con-
ept of open innovation by focusing on the appropriability strategy
nd its relation to hard and soft forms of openness. This responds to
 call in the recent open innovation literature (Chesbrough, 2006;
ahlander and Gann, 2010) for more investigation into the strategic
imensions of ﬁrms’ openness decisions.
. Hypotheses
.1. The relationship between appropriability strategy and
penness
There is a complex and intimate relation between how ﬁrms
ry to appropriate rents or proﬁts from their innovations, and
ow open these ﬁrms are to the external environment. There
re substantial risks from openness to external ﬁrms and organi-
ations (Gans and Stern, 2003; Shane, 2003; Chesbrough, 2006),
he most extreme being theft. More commonly, ﬁrms fear “invol-
ntary outgoing spillover”, that is, leakage of critical knowledge
bout the ﬁrm’s innovation efforts to its competitors (Cassiman and
eugelers, 2002). For example, knowing where a ﬁrm is focusing its
nnovative efforts could provide important information to skilled
ivals about how to shape their own search efforts and target the
ame markets.
In order to guard against theft and unwanted spillovers, ﬁrms
an employ a range of legal protection methods, such as patents,
ecrecy, and trademarks. However, the value of formal types of pro-
ection mechanisms is limited to their defensibility in legal suits
nd/or the ﬁrm’s ability to demonstrate a credible threat in a legal
ntervention (Gans and Stern, 2003; Sherry and Teece, 2004). Even
f legal protection methods are enforceable, skilled rivals may  be
ble to invent around existing patents relatively quickly (Mansﬁeld
t al., 1981). In addition, many of the key features of modern inno-
ations do not lend themselves to formal IP protection because theyPolicy 43 (2014) 867–878 869
relate to customer experience or the “look and feel” of a prod-
uct. Also, informal protection mechanisms, such as secrecy, can
be breeched by competitors by “poaching” workers from incum-
bent ﬁrms or reverse engineering their products. In the case of
lead times or ﬁrst mover advantages, these can dissipate quickly
in the face of strong competition and rapid technological change
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998). As a result, ﬁrms often oper-
ate in environments of leaky knowledge, strong competition from
skilled and experienced competitors, and the threat of new ﬁrms
entering their product markets. Some of these competitors may
have access to considerable complementary assets which may  out-
number and be more effective than the incumbent ﬁrm’s own assets
and capabilities.
Therefore, it is clear that managing external sources of innova-
tion and related linkages involves huge information asymmetries.
In order to gain access to and convince potential partners of the
beneﬁts of exchange, it is necessary to negotiate formal contracts
or at least informal agreements based on a degree of mutual under-
standing. External partners will require enough information about
an idea to develop some belief in its eventual successful commer-
cialization. In other words, they need to know about the idea before
they invest in it. This introduces what Arrow (1962) described as
the paradox of disclosure,  where in “trading ideas, the willingness-
to-pay of potential buyers depends on their knowledge of the idea,
yet the knowledge of the idea implies that potential buyers need not
pay in order to exploit it” (Gans and Stern, 2003: 338). When nego-
tiating contracts in the market for ideas, disclosure can increase the
bargaining power of the buyer and reduce the power of the inno-
vator, especially in the absence of credible threats and IP rights
protection.
This paradox of disclosure applies also to a range of external
interactions between the innovating ﬁrm and the external envi-
ronment, beyond the commercial transaction of selling the idea.
Indeed, to win the support of external parties or to gain access
to external knowledge sources, it is usually necessary for ﬁrms
to share knowledge with other actors in the innovation system
(von Hippel, 1987). For instance, working with suppliers on the
development of innovations normally requires extensive mutual
coordination and commitment (Dyer and Singh, 1998). In addition,
von Hippel (1986, 1988) shows that many innovators work closely
with lead users and other customers on the development of new
products. As Nelson (1995) suggests, external knowledge sharing
allows ﬁrms to build networks and communities around areas of
mutual interest, facilitating the formation of institutions that help
to support the development of a new area of practice (see also,
Spencer, 2001; Alexy et al., 2013). Even working with a university
partner on a collaborative research project will require the ﬁrm
to provide some insights into its problems to allow the academic
partner to tailor its research appropriately (Perkmann and Walsh,
2009).
Against this background, we  suggest that it is crucially impor-
tant for ﬁrms to align how they protect their innovations, with
their engagement with external actors. One  solution might be
for ﬁrms to rely on a strategy that involves partial disclosure of
some central part of the traded knowledge while controlling access
to other parts of the knowledge. In the context of open source
software, Henkel (2006) describes such an approach as “selec-
tive revealing” (see also Alexy et al., 2013). Firms can also use
their behavior regarding appropriability to send “quality” signals
to other parties. Signaling involves one entity credibly conveying
some information about itself to another (Connelly et al., 2011). The
idea that particular strategies resulting in certain behaviors can be
interpreted as signals, which, in turn, can solve problems related
to asymmetric information, has been applied to various contexts
including, signaling individuals’ abilities in the job-market (see the
seminal signaling paper by Spence, 1973) and product innovation
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trategies (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983). In our context, an
mphasis on appropriability may  be interpreted by external parties
s signaling the focal ﬁrm’s possession of valuable technological
nowledge and, consequently, its potential value as a collaborator
or an attractive investment object for a ﬁnancier).4 It also signals
o potential partners the ﬁrm’s awareness of the importance of
ppropriability mechanisms, such as patents or secrecy.
Although an emphasis on appropriability can be associated with
ffective external engagement, the literature on open innovation
hows that over-emphasis on this area can have signiﬁcant neg-
tive consequences for the possibilities for external collaboration
Laursen and Salter, 2005; Chesbrough, 2006; Alexy et al., 2009;
eitzig and Puranam, 2009). For instance, legal departments can
ut strict limits on individual employees exchanging knowledge
cross the ﬁrm boundary, and adopt a defensive stance in order to
nsure priority for subsequent patent claims (Davis and Harrison,
001). Many large ﬁrms require their staff to obtain permission
rom the legal team before engaging with external parties, which
cts as a signiﬁcant hurdle to working with new external partners
Alexy et al., 2009). Legal departments often require collaboration
greements to be in place before embarking on an exchange with an
xternal party, and complex negotiations may  hamper the devel-
pment of emergent collaboration. Mechanisms to ensure secrecy
nd protect lead times might discourage ﬁrms from engaging in
nformal exchanges with external actors (Liebeskind, 1997). Thus,
hile some emphasis on appropriability sends a positive signal
o potential collaborators, too strong a focus could be interpreted
s signaling that collaboration with the focal ﬁrm will be difﬁ-
ult, and that conﬂicts over control and ownership of knowledge
ight ensue. Application of overly restrictive protection mecha-
isms might reduce the interest of ﬁrm managers in collaboration,
nd scare off external actors in the innovation system.
The above discussion suggests that the ﬁrm’s appropriability
trategy is linked closely to the ﬁrm’s level of openness. Although
rms may  need to be open to a range of external actors, they also
eed to appropriate the proﬁts from their innovations, and whether
his openness can be considered hard or soft, there needs to be
eans in place to protect their IP. Thus, openness and some sort
f appropriability strategy go hand in hand: ﬁrms need to disclose
ome knowledge in order to gain from external parties, but they
eed also to protect parts of their knowledge if they are to gain
alue from the exchange. Too strong an emphasis on appropriabil-
ty will weaken the relationship between appropriability and soft
r hard forms of openness. Thus, we posit:
ypothesis 1a. The strength of ﬁrms’ appropriability strategies
ill show a concave relationship with external search breadth.
ypothesis 1b. The strength of ﬁrms’ appropriability strategies
ill show a concave relationship with innovation collaboration
readth.
We have addressed the implications of appropriability for exter-
al search and formal collaboration, but we need also to investigate
he differences between these two forms of openness. There is a
trong suggestion that the implications of high levels of appropri-
bility play out differently for hard and soft forms of openness:
rms that invoke strong protection mechanisms to help capture
4 Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) suggest that an important reason for ﬁrms dis-
losing private technological knowledge is that it is a quality signal to the capital
arkets. Haeussler et al. (2009) argue and corroborate empirically that investors
re  faced with considerable uncertainty and therefore rely on patents as signals
hen trying to assess the prospects of potential portfolio companies. While we
ote that signals to the capital market may  be an important reason for a forceful
ppropriability strategy, addressing this issue in depth is beyond the scope of this
aper.Policy 43 (2014) 867–878
value from their innovative efforts are likely to ﬁnd it more difﬁ-
cult to ﬁnd partners to collaborate with, but less likely to ﬁnd that it
hampers external search. This is because although a strong empha-
sis on appropriability might deter potential formal collaborators, it
does not scare off external sources, such as universities or suppli-
ers, from engaging in informal exchanges of knowledge. Relatedly,
external search requires less two-way interaction. Accordingly, we
suggest that the underlying negative effect of high levels of appro-
priability on openness will be stronger for formal collaboration than
for external search breadth. Thus,
Hypothesis 2. The concavity of the relationship between strength
of ﬁrms’ appropriability strategies and openness will be stronger for
formal innovation collaboration breadth than for external search
breadth.
3.2. Openness, appropriability and competitor collaboration
It is clear that many ﬁrms rely on competitors to provide crit-
ical information to guide and shape their own innovative efforts
(von Hippel, 1988). Firms can learn from their competitors directly
or indirectly—indirect learning being more common than direct
collaboration. Indirect learning includes reverse engineering of
competing products or mirroring the innovative efforts of com-
petitors in own product development efforts (Allen, 1977). Many
ﬁrms make active efforts to track and monitor their competitors’
activities by scrutinizing product announcements, patent appli-
cations and university collaboration partners (Slater and Narver,
1995). Although less common, an important mechanism to access
external knowledge is collaboration with a competitor (Hamel
et al., 1989), for example on the development of pre-competitive
research projects (Spencer, 2003), in the standards setting process
(Leiponen, 2008), over community building initiatives (Dahlander
and Gann, 2010), or via licensing agreements (Leone and Reichstein,
2012).
However, learning from competitors is a risky game, and the
dangers of theft or unplanned outward spillovers are great. More-
over, these risks are much greater in the context of external search
or innovation collaboration with competitors than in relation to
interactions with any other actor in the ﬁrm’s portfolio of exter-
nal search channels or innovation collaborations. This is because
the content and structural compatibility of competitors’ knowledge
may  be the same as that of the focal ﬁrm (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998),
allowing competitors potentially to beneﬁt relatively easy from any
involuntary outward spillovers. Therefore, we suggest that work-
ing with competitors requires the ﬁrm to pay extra attention to
appropriability to avoid unwanted spillovers of knowledge. It can
be assumed that only ﬁrms with strong appropriability strategies
will engage in collaborations with competitors; therefore, the pres-
ence of a competitor in the ﬁrm’s portfolio of knowledge sources
or collaboration partners will strengthen the association between
appropriability and openness. Conversely, if there are no competi-
tor ﬁrms in the focal ﬁrm’s partner portfolio, then the need for
appropriability mechanisms is reduced. Thus:
Hypothesis 3. The absence of competitors in ﬁrms’ knowledge
sourcing portfolios or collaboration partner portfolios weakens
the connection between appropriability and openness in rela-
tion to external search breadth or formal innovation collaboration
breadth.
4. Data and method4.1. Data
The data for the analysis are from the 4th UK Innovation Survey.
The background and motivation for innovation surveys is described
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Here, we  focus on the subset of startups with formal R&D activi-
ties, to create the variable R&D active startups. However, we do not
have information on small startups (less than 10 employees), nor
do we have information on ﬁrms that did not survive. We  include aK. Laursen, A.J. Salter / Res
n the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
OECD) Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005). Innovation surveys are part
f a wider tradition of innovation studies that involve “subject-
riented” and “object-oriented” approaches to the collection of
nformation on innovation activities (Smith, 2005). Innovations
urveys are “subject-oriented” because managers are asked directly
o describe their innovative activities. National innovation surveys
re based on the Yale and other surveys of innovative activities,
uch as R&D surveys (for examples, see Pavitt, 1984; Levin et al.,
987; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Klevorick et al., 1995). Since the
arly 1990s, innovations surveys have been conducted by many
overnments and statistics agencies around the world, includ-
ng most members of the European Union, South Africa, Canada,
ustralia and the US among others.
The UK government has conducted an innovation survey every
ew years since the early 1990s, and in 2005 it administered the
th UK Innovation Survey. Administration of the survey and data
ollection was  managed by the Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS),
he UK ofﬁcial government statistical ofﬁce (Robson and Ortmans,
006). This was a postal survey sent to more than 28,000 busi-
ess units in the UK, based on a sample of ﬁrms created by the
NS. The sample covers ﬁrms with more than 10 employees. In
rder to ensure adequate regional and industry response rates, the
NS conducted a census of all ﬁrms with more than 250 employ-
es and a stratiﬁed sample of ﬁrms with less than 250 employees
small and medium sized enterprises—SMEs). The SMEs were from
3 industries and 12 regions based on information contained in the
NS Inter-Departmental Business Register (DTI, 2005). Although
esponse was voluntary, the survey response rate was 58%. The
esponse rates for individual sectors, regions and size classes were
imilar to the aggregate response rate (Robson and Ortmans, 2006).
he sample of manufacturing ﬁrms included 4863 ﬁrms. In this
tudy, we use the 2931 manufacturing ﬁrms with non-missing val-
es that declared past or current innovative activities. Of the 2931
rms, 744 relied on past innovations, but did not innovate in 2004.
The questionnaire was addressed to the individual in the ﬁrm
fﬁcially responsible for providing information on the ﬁrm’s activ-
ties to the ONS (such as information used to calculate the UK’s
ross Domestic Product). The questionnaire is based on the OECD’s
slo Manual, which has been extensively piloted and pre-tested in
he UK and other European countries (Smith, 2005). The UK gov-
rnment also commissioned additional pilot studies (Bullock et al.,
004). To help avoid common method bias, the questionnaire was
onstructed to include different types of responses. For example,
esponse types included Likert scales, yes/no answers, indications
f percentages and questions requiring absolute numbers. To check
or common method bias, we conducted a Harman’s one-factor test
n the items included. Since we identiﬁed a number of factors and
ince the primary factor accounted for less than the majority of
he variance (the ﬁrst factor accounted for 31% of the variance),
here appear to be no potential problems associated with common
ethod bias (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). The survey was  adminis-
ered in a single wave which does not allow us to compare early and
ate respondents. A high response rate is commonly acknowledged
o avoid non-response bias (Armstrong and Overton, 1977: 396):
n this context, a 58%response rate can be considered excellent.
.2. Measures
.2.1. Dependent variable
We  use two variables to measure external search breadth and
nnovation collaboration breadth. External search breadth is the
umber of external sources of knowledge or information used by
he ﬁrm in its innovative activities. The survey lists ten possible
xternal sources and ﬁrms were asked to indicate the importance
on a 0–3 scale) of each of these sources. The list of sources includedPolicy 43 (2014) 867–878 871
in the questionnaire was broad and the items were not exclusive.
The list reﬂects the range of sources associated with the innovation
system, including suppliers, clients and competitors, and also gen-
eral institutions, such as regulatory and standards bodies (Lundvall,
1992; Nelson, 1993; Spencer, 2001). Following Laursen and Salter
(2004, 2006), this measure has been used in numerous studies of
open innovation to proxy for ﬁrm-level openness (see for example,
Tether and Tajar, 2008; Grimpe and Sofka, 2009; Lee et al., 2010;
Leiponen and Helfat, 2010; Garriga et al., 2013; Love et al., 2013).
We use the six types of organizational sources—suppliers, clients
or customers, competitors, consultants and private R&D insti-
tutes, universities, and public research institutes—which focuses
on sources where interaction might be involved, in turn involving
risk of knowledge outﬂows. We  excluded sources where interac-
tion would not occur (such as scientiﬁc publications, and technical
standards). First, each of the six sources is coded as a binary variable
indicate the importance of the knowledge source with 0 indicat-
ing no or low and 1 indicating medium or high importance. Then
the six sources are summed with the ﬁrm scoring 0 if no knowl-
edge sources are used and 6 if all knowledge sources are used. The
set of items appears to have a high degree of internal consistency
(Cronbach’s Alpha Coefﬁcient = 0.80). In order to apply fractional
response regression (see below), we  normalize the variable by
dividing by the highest possible number of sources used (6), so
that the resulting variable takes a minimum value of 0 and a max-
imum of 1. To measure collaboration breadth, ﬁrms were asked
to indicate whether or not they had collaborated on innovation
activities with any of the six types of organizations listed above, in
the period 2002–2004. The measure was  then computed similar to
search breadth (Cronbach’s Alpha Coefﬁcient = 0.88).
4.2.2. Explanatory variables
To obtain some insight into the role of appropriability methods
at ﬁrm level, we  draw on the responses to a question in the sur-
vey on the degree of importance to the ﬁrm of different methods
of protection. The survey question is similar to those used in pre-
vious studies of appropriability methods (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen
et al., 2000; Jensen and Webster, 2009). Based on the responses,
we created a measure of the overall strength of the ﬁrm’s appro-
priability strategy by adding up the uses of the six measures of
formal and informal protection listed in the survey (scored on a
0–3 scale). The six items are patents, registration of design, trade-
marks, secrecy, lead time, and complexity. The set of items appears
to have a high degree of internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha
Coefﬁcient = 0.86).5
To control for the importance of absorptive capacity, we  use
ﬁrm-level R&D intensity (R&D expenditure divided by sales) (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990). The numerator is taken from the UK innova-
tion survey, while the denominator—ﬁrm sales—is based on ONS
register data, supplied with the survey data, for the same year
(2004). We control also for ﬁrm size, measured as number of employ-
ees (expressed in logarithms). Number of employees is taken from
ONS register data, supplied with the survey data, for year 2004. In
order to control for breadth of openness of new ﬁrms, we include a
measure for whether the ﬁrm was established after 1 January 2000.5 Note that our main independent variable takes account of both variation
stemming from the number of appropriability mechanisms and the importance
attributed to each, but our dependent variables do not take account of the impor-
tance of each type of collaboration because we  do not have information on the
importance attributed to each of the innovation collaborators of the focal ﬁrm.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics and simple correlations (n = 2931).
Variable Mean Std. D. Min. Max. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1 External search breadth 0.39 0.26 0 1
2  Innovation collaboration breadth 0.14 0.27 0 1 0.30
3  Appropriability strategy 6.70 5.50 0 18 0.48 0.28
4  R&D intensity 0.01 0.05 0 0.83 0.14 0.16 0.18
5  R&D start-up 0.05 0.23 0 1 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.14
6  Number of employees (log) 4.27 1.43 2.30 9.94 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.02 -0.03
7  Part of an enterprise group 0.44 0.50 0 1 0.15 0.17 0.27 0.07 0.01 0.49
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innovation collaboration breadth, although we cannot draw ﬁrm
conclusions based only on the descriptive statistics.
The main results of the seemingly unrelated fractional response8  Market size 3.16 1.62 1 
ote: Correlations equal to or above |0.04| are signiﬁcant at p < 0.05. Two-tailed test
ontrol for ﬁrms’ market size based on a measure of involve-
ent local, regional, national or international markets. Finally, we
nclude 14 industry dummies and 12 regional dummies to account
or different propensities for openness across industries and geo-
raphic space.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and simple correla-
ions among our variables. None of the correlations are sufﬁciently
trong to require further investigation of potential multicollinear-
ty problems. Table 2 shows average values for the strength of the
ppropriability strategy, external search breadth, and collaboration
readth, by industry. In line with the results of the Yale and Carnegie
ellon surveys, chemicals and electronics have particularly high
cores for appropriability, while the low-tech industries have rela-
ively low appropriability scores. Overall, across industries, there is
 broad correspondence between levels of appropriability, external
earch breadth and collaboration breadth.
.3. Statistical method and regression results
Our dependent variables (external search breadth and collabo-
ation breadth) take on non-negative integer values because they
re counts of scores. A Poisson regression model (or negative
inomial regression in the case of overdispersion) might seem a
easonable choice. However, in our setting we have two  depend-
nt variables that are restricted by an upper bound (6 is the
aximum of sources/collaboration partners), making Poisson or
egative Binomial distributions not applicable. Instead, we follow
ooldridge (2002: 661) who suggests that the dependent variable
an be “obtained by dividing a count variable by an upper bound”,
nd that such a transformation means that fractional logit regres-
ion can be applied (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). In this approach,
(y|x) is modeled as a logistic function, where y is the dependent
ariable and x is a set of regressors: E(y|x) = exp(xˇ)/[1 + exp(xˇ)].
able 2
trength of appropriability strategy, External search breadth and Innovation collab-
ration breadth, industry averages.
Industry Strength of
appropriability
strategy
External search
breadth (×6)
Innovation
collaboration
breadth (×6)
Food, drink and tobacco 5.68 0.42 0.72
Textiles 6.68 2.20 0.77
Wood 4.40 2.19 0.62
Paper and printing 4.89 2.15 0.52
Reﬁned petroleum products 6.00 1.86 1.00
Chemicals 10.05 2.82 1.31
Plastics 7.34 2.57 0.98
Non-metallic minerals 5.82 2.21 0.77
Basic metal 5.80 2.16 1.02
Fabric. metal products 4.82 1.99 0.48
Machinery 7.53 2.43 0.89
Electrical 8.40 2.80 1.14
Transport 7.67 2.47 0.99
Other 6.30 2.19 0.50
Average across industries 6.53 2.17 0.845 0.20 0.21 0.35 0.14 0.03 0.30 0.25
This model ensures that the predicted values of y are in (0, 1)
and that the effect of any xj on E(y|x) diminishes as x  ˇ → ∞.
Accordingly, the method is non-linear. It can be estimated using
quasi-maximum likelihood (Wooldridge, 2002). We estimate the
models using seemingly unrelated estimations since this method
allows us to take into account that decisions regarding external
search and collaboration are often closely related. When comput-
ing the standard errors, the procedure estimates the simultaneous
covariance of the coefﬁcients in the two models (for search and
collaboration).
To graph the relationships, we apply a simulation-based
technique proposed by King et al. (2000) and introduced to manage-
ment research by Zelner (2009). The simulation approach involves
taking a number of draws from the multivariate normal distribu-
tion around the estimated coefﬁcient vector from the non-linear
model (in our case, the fractional response model), and the esti-
mated variance–covariance matrix, for the coefﬁcient estimates in
the model. To perform the simulations, we  take 10,000 draws and
use a modiﬁed version of the Stata code provided by Brambor et al.
(2006).
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for average level of
external search and collaboration for each of the 19 possible out-
comes for the strength of appropriability strategy variable. The
descriptive statistics seem to be consistent with the idea of a con-
cave association (in terms of decreasing positive marginal effects)
with a somewhat stronger concave relationship in the case ofregressions are presented in Table 4. The estimations in Models
Table 3
Averages of external search breadth and innovation collaboration breadth averages
for given levels of strength of appropriability strategy.
Strength of
appropriability
strategy, outcome #
Frequency External search
breadth (×6),
average
Innovation
collaboration breadth
(×6), average
0 700 1.33 0.21
1 70 1.66 0.24
2 118 1.83 0.37
3 164 2.23 0.60
4 134 2.16 0.58
5 124 2.25 0.95
6 204 2.63 0.73
7 127 2.60 0.80
8 138 2.57 0.93
9 189 2.72 1.05
10  128 2.79 1.30
11  141 2.76 1.34
12  186 3.38 1.19
13  111 3.23 1.50
14  101 3.29 1.20
15  93 3.28 1.57
16  79 3.42 1.80
17  36 3.47 1.53
18  88 3.84 1.18
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Table  4
Seemingly unrelated fractional response regressions: the relationship between appropriability strategy and openness.
External search breadth Innovation collaboration breadth
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err.
Appropriability strategy 0.155*** (0.012) 0.142*** (0.013) 0.278*** (0.029) 0.215*** (0.029)
Appropriability strategy sq. −0.004 (0.001) −0.003*** (0.001) −0.009*** (0.002) −0.008*** (0.002)
R&D  intensity 0.939** (0.369) 2.714*** (0.664)
R&D  start-up 0.308*** (0.073) 0.687*** (0.169)
Number of employees (log) 0.106*** (0.016) 0.267*** (0.036)
Part  of an enterprise group −0.082† (0.045) 0.095 (0.098)
Market size 0.004 (0.014) 0.106*** (0.032)
Constant −1.25*** (0.044) −1.893*** (0.103) −3.227*** (0.117) −4.645*** (0.245)
Industry effects (14) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography effects (12) Yes Yes Yes Yes
No.  of obs. 2931 2931 2931 2931
Log  likelihood −1378 −1364 −957 −906
ML  (Cox–Snell) R2: 0.23 0.26 0.08 0.15
Model statistics are single equation statistics.
† Two-tailed test: p < 0.10.
*
I
I
w
o
a
a
e
a
o
(
t
b
n
d
a
F
i
w
t
b
b
F
aTwo-tailed test: p < 0.05.
** Two-tailed test: p < 0.01.
*** Two-tailed test: p < 0.001.
 and III are excluding the control variables and in Models II and
V include the full set of controls. The results are (also) consistent
ith Hypotheses 1a and 1b—that the relationship between strength
f the ﬁrms’ appropriability strategy, and external search breadth
nd collaboration breadth is concave. The parameters of strength of
ppropriability strategy are positive and signiﬁcant, and the param-
ters of strength of appropriability strategy squared are negative
nd signiﬁcant. The predictions depicted in Figs. 1 and 2 are based
n Models II and IV and illustrate that there is a concave relationship
at least in terms of decreasing positive marginal effects) between
he strength of ﬁrms’ appropriability strategies, and external search
readth and innovation collaboration breadth.
The curves indicate that the concave relationship is more pro-
ounced for collaboration breadth, although the slope of the curve
oes not bend strongly downwards after a theoretical top-point of
pproximately 13 on the 18-point appropriability strategy scale.
or external search breadth, the theoretical top-point of the curve
s not within the range of the variable. These observations are in line
ith Hypothesis 2 that the concavity of the relationship betweenhe strength of ﬁrms’ appropriability strategies and openness will
e stronger for innovation collaboration than for external search
readth. For further conﬁrmation of these ﬁndings, we apply a
ig. 1. Relationship between external search breadth and the strength of ﬁrms’
ppropriability strategies.statistical test to assess whether the coefﬁcient of (the strength of)
the appropriability strategy is signiﬁcantly higher for innovation
collaboration than for external search, and whether the negative
coefﬁcient of appropriability strategy squared is signiﬁcantly lower
(more negative) for innovation collaboration than for external
search. Using the “stacking” data method implemented in Stata’s
suest estimation procedure, we perform two Wald tests that take
account of the covariance in the parameters across the two  mod-
els, which ensures that the tests for the equality of the coefﬁcients
are correct (StataCorp, 2009, pp. 1812–1814). We  ﬁnd that the
coefﬁcient of (the strength of) appropriability strategy is signiﬁ-
cantly higher for innovation collaboration than for external search
(p = 0.0047) and that the negative coefﬁcient of appropriability
strategy squared is signiﬁcantly lower (more negative) for innova-
tion collaboration than for external search (p = 0.0025). These tests
also lend support for Hypothesis 2.
We  use a split sample procedure to test Hypothesis 3 that the
exclusion of competitors from ﬁrms’ knowledge sourcing portfo-
lios or collaboration partner portfolios weakens the connection
between appropriability and openness in relation to external search
or formal collaboration. We  ﬁnd only partial support for this
hypothesis, since the results depend on which groups of ﬁrms are
Fig. 2. Relationship between breadth of collaboration and the strength of ﬁrms’
appropriability strategies.
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Table 5
Seemingly unrelated fractional response regressions: The relationship between appropriability strategy and openness when considering competitors in the openness portfolio
or  not.
External search breadth Innovation collaboration breadth
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err.
Appropriability strategy 0.028*** (0.005) 0.040*** (0.004) 0.021* (0.008) 0.070*** (0.018)
Appropriability strategy sq. – – – –
R&D  intensity 1.162** (0.438) 0.914* (0.400) 0.650 (0.488) −1.473 (1.180)
R&D  start-up 0.139 (0.106) 0.064 (0.069) 0.227† (0.124) 0.355 (0.248)
Number of employees (log) 0.056** (0.020) 0.055*** (0.016) 0.087** (0.028) 0.008 (0.061)
Part  of an enterprise group −0.069 (0.050) −0.077† (0.046) −0.074 (0.081) 0.224 (0.184)
Market size 0.001 (0.015) −0.032* (0.014) 0.077*** (0.024) −0.087 (0.056)
Constant −1.335*** (0.101) −0.151 (0.105) −1.309*** (0.181) 0.794 (0.499)
Industry effects (14) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography effects (12) Yes Yes Yes Yes
No.  of obs. 981 1479 465 286
Log  likelihood −423.1 −692.8 −216.4 −118.6
ML  (Cox–Snell) R2: 0.21 0.21 0.10 0.04
Sample Not including
competitors in the
openness portfolio
Including competitors
in the openness
portfolio
Not including
competitors in the
openness portfolio
Including competitors
in the openness
portfolio
Model statistics are single equation statistics.
† Two-tailed test: p < 0.10.
* Two-tailed test: p < 0.05.
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ompared. If we consider only the group of ﬁrms that engage in
xternal search or collaboration (and exclude those that do not),
e ﬁnd evidence that is consistent with Hypothesis 3—of a stronger
elationship between appropriability and openness if ﬁrms include
ompetitors in their openness portfolios compared to the alterna-
ive situations. This evidence is based on the “stacking” data method
eferred to above (StataCorp, 2009)—the method ensures that the
esults of the Wald test for equality of the coefﬁcients are correct
hen comparing across models. Table 5 presents a split sam-
le analysis comparing the relevant coefﬁcients to appropriability
note that in the split sample analysis, we drop appropriability
quared since this term is never signiﬁcant in this analysis) per-
aining to both external search breadth and external collaboration
readth. The coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly smaller for the model
ncluding ﬁrms that do not use competitors for sources of knowl-
dge or collaboration (Wald test signiﬁcant at 0.1% in both cases),
mplying that that the positive relationship between both forms of
penness and appropriability strategy are moderated resulting in
 weaker relationship if competitors are not exploited.
If we expand the sample to our full sample by also including
closed” ﬁrms, that is, ﬁrms that do not engage in external search
r collaboration for our the analysis, the results (not reported here
or reasons of space) are not conﬁrmed. For both types of open-
ess, we ﬁnd a linear relationship between appropriability and
penness if competitors are included in the portfolio (very sig-
iﬁcant coefﬁcients of 0.04 for search and 0.07 for collaboration),
nd a concave relationship between appropriability and openness
f competitors are not used (very signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of 0.332 for
earch/−0.135 search squared and 0.342 for collaboration/−0.012
ollaboration squared). So while the cost-side of appropriability is
ess evident in the case of involvement of competitors (which is
onsistent with Hypothesis 3), across most of the distribution, the
elationship between openness and appropriability is stronger if
ompetitors are not included in the openness portfolio compared
o if they are included. These results would appear to run counter
o Hypothesis 3.
The difference in the ﬁndings for these two setups is that includ-
ng zero search or zero collaboration ﬁrms in the group of ﬁrms
ith no competitors in the collaboration portfolio enhances therelationship between openness and appropriability for that group
compared to the group that use competitors. However, although
ﬁrms that neither search externally nor collaborate do have appro-
priability mechanisms in place (153 out of a total of 471 ﬁrms for
external search breadth, and 1536 out of 2180 for collaboration
breadth), the probability of observing low levels of openness com-
bined with low appropriability is higher for this group of ﬁrms. For
this reason, comparing ﬁrms that do and do not use competitors,
but including only those with non-zero search/collaboration may
be the “cleanest” test of the hypothesis. In sum, however, we ﬁnd
only partial support for Hypothesis 3.
4.4. Alternative explanations and robustness checks
To rule out alternative explanations and to check the robustness
of our results, we specify several alternative econometric mod-
els. There might be concern that our results depend ultimately
on the inclusion of squared terms in the regressions. We  would
argue that the squared terms need to be explicitly modeled because
they are strongly signiﬁcant and, hence, their exclusion would
lead to biased estimations (especially for innovation collaboration
breadth). However, Table 6 Models I and IV present the estima-
tions with the squared terms excluded. These models conﬁrm
the predominantly positive relationship between strength of the
appropriability strategy on the one hand, and breadth of external
search and collaboration on the other.
There also might be concern that the relationship detected
could be inﬂated due to an endogeneity problem—in particular the
self-selection of appropriability and openness strategies by “high-
quality” ﬁrms. In the absence of instrumental variables that would
fulﬁll both the strength and validity requirements, we included
in our two equations two  proxies for “high-quality ﬁrms” in the
context of innovation. Arguably, innovation is the central outcome
variable related to open innovation, and the available econometric
evidence demonstrates that innovative ﬁrms demonstrate higher
productivity, higher proﬁts, better export performance, higher
market value, better credit ratings, larger market share and higher
probability of survival in the market (Geroski et al., 1993; Banbury
and Mitchell, 1995; Blundell et al., 1999; Hall, 2000; Czarnitzki and
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Kraft, 2004; Ceﬁs and Marsili, 2005; Parisi et al., 2006; Cassiman
and Golovko, 2011; Hall, 2011).
To measure innovation, we use percentage of sales of products
new to the ﬁrm in the previous three years. To measure quality
we include labor productivity, measured as sales over number of
employees. The results are presented in Table 6, Models II and V.
The main ﬁnding is that the magnitudes of the appropriability vari-
ables become slightly smaller, but the signs and signiﬁcance are
virtually unchanged (for both dependent variables). The parameter
for innovation outcome is positive and strongly signiﬁcant, while
that for labor productivity is signiﬁcant only for search breadth.
We do not report these results as our main results since innova-
tion outcome and productivity cannot strictly be considered inputs
to openness (rather openness is an input to the productivity and
innovation outcome equations); we include R&D intensity as a
measure of innovation inputs in our equations. We  tried excluding
the (744) ﬁrms that had not innovated in 2004 due to prior inno-
vations, although this choice might give rise to sample selection
bias (results not presented here for reasons of space). The results
reduced the size of the appropriability parameters, but not their
signiﬁcance except in the case of search breadth where appropri-
ability squared lost its signiﬁcance. Thus, as such the results for
the reduced sample are consistent with our main results. Arguably,
our robustness checks do not provide a perfect solution, but we
believe that they show that unobserved heterogeneity related to
self-selection by “high-quality” ﬁrms (and parallel negative selec-
tion by “low-quality” ﬁrms) is unlikely to be driving our results to
any great extent.
Another concern is the possibility that inter-industry differ-
ences in appropriability regimes (Levin et al., 1987) might be
driving our results. Due to potential multicollinearity between our
industry-ﬁxed effects and an industry-level appropriability vari-
able, it is challenging to check this. We tried two different methods
to account for industry-ﬁrm differences. First, we created indus-
try averages (for 21 different industries) for the importance of
our appropriability measure and included these industry aver-
age scores in the regressions. Given that we  include only 14
industry-ﬁxed effects, we can identify the model while including
an industry-level variable, created based on industry averages for
the 21 different industries. The results are presented in Table 6,
Models III and VI. Our main results are unchanged; the industry-
level appropriability variables are not signiﬁcant in the regression
for collaboration breadth (whether or not we include industry
dummies). However, in the regression for external search, the
effect of industry-level importance on appropriability and appro-
priability squared, shows a signiﬁcant U-shaped relationship (with
a minimum value of the independent variable below the maximum
range of the variable). Nevertheless, our results are unchanged
by the inclusion of this variable. We  also tried including individ-
ual industry-level protection mechanisms; again, the main results
did not change signiﬁcantly. Second, due to the possibility of
multicollinearity as a result of the simultaneous inclusion of the
industry-level appropriability variable and industry ﬁxed effects,
we tried a two-stage approach (see, Reitzig and Puranam, 2009).
In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate models similar to our main mod-
els, using the same estimator (the fractional response model), but
with only regional and industry dummy  variables as regressors.
From these ﬁrst-stage regressions, we extract the residuals, which
become the dependent variables in the second-stage estimations.
In the second stage, the industry-level appropriability variable and
the remaining explanatory variables with the exception of the
regional and industry dummy  variables are included as regres-
sors. The results of this procedure conﬁrm the main results. A
possible problem with the two-stage approach is that the (pre-
dicted) dependent variable in the second stage is estimated with
errors (Hardin, 2002). However, the fact that our results are all
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onsistent (with and without the two-stage approach) tends to
onﬁrm their robustness. Thus, overall, given the results of the
wo robustness checks, differences in appropriability regimes are
nlikely to be driving our results.
In addition, given that our results may  have been a product of
he way we treated our measure of external search, we  experiment
ith a lower cut-off value, including the case of low-use along with
edium and high use: the results are consistent. Finally, we run the
odels using ordered probit estimation: the results for parameters
nd signiﬁcances are remarkably similar to those obtained from the
ractional response model.
. Implications and conclusions
In this paper, we focused on how the openness of the ﬁrm
s linked to its appropriability strategy. We  advanced the idea of
he paradox of openness to understand how managerial attitudes
oward appropriability methods are related to the ﬁrm’s orienta-
ion to external actors in the innovation process. The theorizing
nd the derived results have signiﬁcant implications for the litera-
ure on open innovation and appropriability. The current literature
n open innovation includes mixed and often conﬂicting views on
his relationship. Some parts of the literature emphasize the nega-
ive implications of a strong focus on appropriability for ﬁrm-level
penness. Indeed, Chesbrough’s (2003) book contains a strong nor-
ative statement related to the need for ﬁrms to open themselves
o external actors, and to break away from an overwhelming focus
n protecting their ideas. Similarly, von Hippel (2005) suggests
hat ﬁrms that are overly protective of their knowledge, will miss
pportunities to exchange knowledge with different actors in the
nnovation system. Others have suggested that the formal IP sys-
em may  place strict limits on the potential for open, cumulative
evelopment. Some authors argue that the current focus on appro-
riability is directing ﬁrms away from discovery of new products
nd services toward legal games over ownership of patents (Bessen
nd Maskin, 2009).
At the same time, the open innovation literature highlights how
ppropriability might also enable openness (Chesbrough, 2006).
he existence and use of legal appropriability methods may  give
anagers the conﬁdence to engage more widely with the external
nvironment. In other words, an emphasis on legal appropriability
ight reduce fears of opportunistic behavior from external actors
Teece, 2002). If the ﬁrm has no strategy in place to capture the
alue from its innovative efforts, it might choose to go it alone and
eject other actors in the innovation system. Baum et al. (2000) sug-
est that such an approach could severely limit the opportunities
o successfully develop and commercialize their innovations.
Our study contributes to this discussion. We  ﬁnd that man-
gerial attitudes to openness and appropriability are very closely
onnected. This suggests that a ﬁrm’s inbound open innovation,
hich Dahlander and Gann (2010) describe as often having a
non-pecuniary” logic, may  in fact be strongly inﬂuenced by that
rm’s “pecuniary” logic, manifested by its appropriability strat-
gy. We  found evidence also that an overly strong emphasis on
ppropriability may  be associated with reduced efforts to draw in
nowledge from many different external actors in formal collabo-
ations for innovation. Our results relate to both these perspectives
n the literature discussed above, and highlight the positive and
egative aspect of appropriability for openness.
Our study also draws attention to how different forms of open-
ess might be connected to appropriability concerns. We found that
he negative side of appropriability (a concave rather than a linear
elationship) and its link to openness is greater for formal collabo-
ation than for external search breadth, supporting the hypothesis
hat the “scaring off” effect is stronger for direct collaboration thanPolicy 43 (2014) 867–878
for external search which involves less two-way interaction. We
also examined the particular case of innovation partner portfolios
including or excluding competitors; although our results are not
conclusive, it seems possible that excluding competitors weakens
the link between appropriability and openness.
The present study also advances out understanding of absorp-
tive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) by pointing to the
importance of appropriability strategies in this context. The liter-
ature on absorptive capacity focuses on important aspects such as
ﬁrms’ ability to transform and exploit (“realized absorptive capac-
ity”), or to acquire and explore (“potential absorptive capacity”)
external knowledge (Zahra and George, 2002; Jansen et al., 2005).
This research highlights the knowledge transformation process
(related to exploiting external knowledge) within the receiving
ﬁrm. However, the possibility that the utilization of absorptive
capacity may  involve the ﬁrm in formal and informal knowledge
trading has not been considered in the literature. In the prevailing
models of absorptive capacity, appropriability concerns are often
represented as a second order conditioning factor rather than a
central determining element shaping the ﬁrm’s external knowl-
edge absorption efforts (see Lane et al., 2006; Todorova and Durisin,
2007). Our theoretical and empirical contribution suggests that
potential absorptive capacity needs to be accompanied by a strat-
egy for protecting the ﬁrm’s knowledge in order for the ﬁrm to
be able to exploit the new combinations. Our analysis implies that
these aspects of knowledge exploration and exploitation are con-
nected.
Our study has important implications for research on appro-
priability. As Pisano (2006) suggests, research on appropriability
largely focuses on the industry-level environment and how the
presence of tight or weak appropriability regimes shapes individ-
ual ﬁrm behavior (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000; Arora and
Merges, 2004), and downplays the role of managerial choice in
relation to protecting innovations. In the literature on external col-
laboration and appropriability researchers often rely on industry-
rather than ﬁrm-level measures of appropriability, suggesting that
managers’ have little scope to alter the level of their legal appro-
priability in the face of industry level patterns (Cassiman and
Veugelers, 2002). In contrast, our approach looks at how ﬁrm-level
choices concerning the strength of the appropriability strategy are
connected to ﬁrms’ relationships to external actors in the innova-
tion system.
6. Limitations and future research
There are several limitations to this study. First, it draws on a
rich and detailed cross-section of UK manufacturing ﬁrms’ inno-
vative activities, but these data make it difﬁcult to draw strong
causal inferences about the relationship between appropriability
and openness. As noted in the introduction, our analysis does not
provide any direct evidence of causality. It would be useful to have
panel data or experimental data for analysis to better understand
the direction of the relationship. However, even with panel data,
identifying the precise direction of causality and the strength of
each direction would be difﬁcult (a Granger causality test is likely
to show a bi-directional causality). Second, we  do not have a direct
measure of ﬁrm scope, that is, whether the ﬁrm is engaged across a
range of industries or products in our dataset. For this reason we  are
unable to control directly for ﬁrm scope; however, this limitation
applies to all studies that use Community Innovation Survey-type
data. In addition, many of ﬁrms in our dataset are small ﬁrms and,
therefore, are likely to be active in a small number of markets.
Third, we  have no information on stocks of IP held by each ﬁrm;
it is possible that IP stock shapes the ﬁrm’s approach to engaging
with external actors. Given the small average size of the ﬁrms in
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ur sample and that we measure directly the importance that ﬁrms
ttached to these formal methods, we do not think that this limita-
ion undermines our study. However, it would be useful to examine
he relationships among appropriability strategy, openness, and
tock of IP. Third, like Cohen et al. (2000), our approach is based
n relatively simple addition of the importance that ﬁrms attach
o different protection mechanisms. However, ﬁrms can choose
mong different combinations of protection mechanisms (Fischer
nd Henkel, 2013) and this choice might be related to its openness
o external actors. Future research could explore the link between
his choice among different protection mechanisms, and different
ypes of openness.
The issue of how appropriability strategies enable and constrain
anagerial behavior in other parts of the organization appears also
o be an interesting area for future research. In the paper, we  have
n two different forms of openness—external search and formal
ollaboration, but appropriability choices might also be related to
ther open innovation decisions, such as corporate venture capital
nvestments by large ﬁrms, and interactions between new ﬁrms
nd incumbents. We  need more knowledge about how choices
bout appropriability and openness shape the ﬁrm’s performance,
erhaps especially in the case of young, small ﬁrms. The insights
rom new research on these issues could give additional help to
uide managers confronted by the paradox of openness.
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